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The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the  
“Extra Element” in Breach of Contract Claims  
Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the software boom, and with so much at stake, 
computer software developers scrambled to protect their products from 
blatant copying and unscrupulous takeoffs. Ultimately, they responded 
by imposing restrictive licenses (shrinkwrap licenses1) upon everyone 
who would purchase and use their computer software. The enforcement 
of these licenses has fueled a great debate. Courts and commentators 
alike have questioned whether these licenses strip federally granted 
rights from the public and bestow these rights upon software developers. 
Courts have yet to reach a consensus on whether shrinkwrap licenses, 
backed by state contract law, should be preempted by federal copyright 
law. 
However, an analysis of § 301 of the Copyright Act,2 read in light of 
the purposes of copyright law, shows that breach of contract claims 
based on shrinkwrap licenses should be preempted by copyright law. 
Courts denying preemption under § 301 distinguished copyright claims 
from contract claims by applying the “extra element” test.3 Under this 
 1. Software developers created “shrinkwrap” and “clickwrap” licenses in order to bind 
software users to nonnegotiable, strict terms of usage. Shrinkwrap licenses are printed on the plastic 
wrappers of computer software and opening the wrapper is considered assent to the contractual 
terms. Clickwrap licenses are disclosed during setup of computer software, and a user cannot 
complete installation of the software unless she agrees to the contractual terms. For purposes of this 
Comment, shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses will be collectively referred to as “shrinkwrap” 
licenses. 
Shrinkwrap licenses contain restrictions prohibiting the consumer from translating, 
decompiling, disassembling, or making backup copies of computer software, music, videos, or 
DVDs; also, the consumer may be prohibited from making the software compatible with other 
programs. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). Section 301 of the Copyright Act endows copyright law with 
power to preempt any other legal right that is equivalent to a right granted under copyright law. See 
infra Part III.A for an analysis of § 301. 
 3. The “extra element” test originated in the copyright arena in order to determine whether a 
right lies within the general scope of copyright law. If so, that right is preempted by § 301 of the 
Copyright Act. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999). For a 
discussion of the extra element test, see infra Part III.A.
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test, a contract claim is not equivalent to (and thus not preempted by) a 
copyright claim if the contract claim requires the accuser to prove 
additional elements superfluous to the copyright claim. Courts have 
found that shrinkwrap licenses are not preempted by improperly 
distinguishing the contract claim with the extra element of bargain—an 
element that is not present in shrinkwrap licenses because the consumer 
has no option but to accept the license or return the software to the 
developer. Preemption of shrinkwrap licenses is also proper because it 
does not leave software developers unprotected. Under the current test 
for fair use found in § 107 of the Copyright Act,4 the economic interests 
of computer developers can be respected while allowing the public fair 
use of digital materials (digital fair use5). Further, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act6 (DMCA) serves the interests of software developers by 
prohibiting the circumvention of technological measures that developers 
chose to employ in protecting their software.7
Precluding preemption of breach of contract claims based on 
shrinkwrap licenses presents significant problems. The copyright 
doctrine of fair use—which permits consumers to freely use copyrighted 
materials for limited personal, noncommercial purposes such as archival 
copying, developing interoperability, or modifying computer programs—
will be eviscerated if copyright law wields no preemptive power over 
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses. This problem 
arises because while fair uses cannot constitute copyright infringement, 
these same uses are not insulated against breach of contract claims.8 
Therefore, even though a particular use of copyrighted software is a fair 
use, this public right will not be a valid defense to a breach of contract 
 4. The doctrine of fair use protects the public’s right to freely use copyrighted materials “for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.” 17 
U.S.C. § 107. For example, a book critic is protected by the doctrine of fair use when she copies 
important passages from the book as part of her critique. Without the fair use doctrine, the author of 
the book would be able to hold the critic liable for copyright infringement and thereby suppress 
possibly negative critiques of the book. 
 5. It should be noted that the author uses “digital fair use” to refer only to the fair use of 
digital materials. These materials principally include computer software, which may be protected 
through encryption or some other means or may require the user to enter into a licensing agreement 
before installation or use. 
 6. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), available at http://frwebgate.access. gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_bills&docid=f:h2281enr.txt.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003). 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
 8. See id. 
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claim.9 Thus, allowing breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap 
licenses sets at naught the fair use doctrine and the purposes of Congress. 
By weighing the practical effects of the shrinkwrap licensing provisions 
against the purposes of copyright law, courts should be moved to 
invalidate such provisions. 
This Comment begins by introducing the foundational principles of 
copyright law, including the copyright infringement standard, digital fair 
use, and reverse engineering, a category of fair use. Part II discusses 
several reasons why software developers may have been displeased with 
the protection available to them under copyright law, as well as the 
consequent advent of shrinkwrap licenses. Part III analyzes the 
shrinkwrap licenses under § 301 of the Copyright Act, concluding that 
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses should be 
preempted by copyright law because these claims are substantively 
equivalent to copyright claims. Although some courts have distinguished 
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from copyright 
claims using the extra element test, these courts have inappropriately 
relied on the element of bargain, which is not present in shrinkwrap 
licenses. Part III asserts that conflict preemption is proper because 
shrinkwrap licenses contravene § 107 of the Copyright Act by 
eviscerating the fair use doctrine. Part IV argues that shrinkwrap licenses 
are unnecessary because copyright law, tempered by the fair use 
doctrine, adequately protects both the interests of the public and of the 
software developers. Finally, Part V concludes that preemption is not 
only proper under § 301 but is urged by the policy and goals of copyright 
law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Copyright law protects copyrighted works from unscrupulous 
copying. Although courts and state legislatures have been very 
sympathetic to copyright holders, they have also placed limitations on 
the enforcement of copyrights, such as digital fair use. This limitation 
has arguably translated into rights for the public.10 However, with the 
boom of the computer industry in recent decades, and a lagging judicial 
 9. In a contract dispute involving copyrighted software, any resort to the doctrine of fair use 
is unavailing because it only provides an exception to copyright infringement claims. See id. § 107. 
 10. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996). 
SMI-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 11:31:28 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1376 
 
reaction,11 copyright law became largely ineffective in protecting 
computer software.12 Consequently, software developers and lawmakers 
alike sought remedies to copyright law’s alleged weaknesses through 
state contract law (in the form of shrinkwrap licenses) and congressional 
action.13 While these measures secured greater protection for computer 
software, they also triggered a dissolution of longstanding “rights” 
available to the public under the digital fair use doctrine. Part II.A 
introduces fundamental copyright law principles such as copyright 
infringement and digital fair use. Part II.B then discusses the climate 
surrounding copyright law in recent decades, the advent of shrinkwrap 
licenses, and congressional action taken to protect computer software. 
A. Enforcement of a Copyright and the Fair Use Exception 
With few exceptions, copyright law allows an individual to protect 
her copyrighted expression from unauthorized copying. Congress created 
such protection primarily to encourage the “Progress of Science.”14 The 
“Progress of Science” would be impelled by granting an exclusive right, 
or limited monopoly, to any individual who creates an eligible15 and 
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
 11. See Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap 
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 320 n.9 (1999) (“It still remains to 
be seen whether the law will develop to ‘appropriately resolve the multitude of problems posed by 
the advent of computer technology.’” (quoting Thomas Finkelstein & Douglas C. Wyatt, Shrinkwrap 
Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 839, 839 (1977))). 
 12. See Steven Pepe, Multimedia Computing: Copyright Law’s “Last Stand,” 12 TOURO L. 
REV. 143, 144 n.8 (1995), available at http://www.tourolaw.edu/publications/lawreview/ 
vol12n1/pg143.html#RFn8 (last visited October 13, 2003). 
 13. Software developers’ decision to resort to shrinkwrap licenses evidences a reliance on 
other areas of law in order to protect their interests. Additionally, the creation and encouragement of 
legislation in recent years, such as the DMCA and Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA), evidences the interests of numerous groups to help the law catch up to the technological 
boom. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 14. Congress was given the necessary power by the Constitution to create a law that provided 
this incentive for copyright holders. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. In 1790, Congress exercised its power and adopted the first copyright act. 1 U.S. Stat. 124 
(1790). Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 suggests that copyright law is founded in an economic 
rationale. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: 
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 483 & n.15 (1995) (discussing 
the changing perspective of copyright law in America from an economic-based approach to the 
moralistic approach used in many foreign countries). 
 15. See O’Rourke, supra note 14, at 481 n.8 (enumerating the various statutory categories of 
copyrightable subject matter). 
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expression.”16 A copyright holder may find that enforcement of this 
limited monopoly can be very lucrative. 
In enforcing a copyright, courts have developed a flexible standard 
which can be applied on a case-by-case basis. This standard considers the 
nature of the work, the allegedly infringing actions, and any possible 
defenses to the alleged copyright infringement. This section will discuss 
the standard of copyright infringement and the application of digital fair 
use in the infringement analysis. 
1. Enforcing a copyright through an infringement claim 
In order to establish a cause of action for infringement of a 
copyright, a copyright holder must prove several things. First, the 
copyright holder must prove that she complied with all applicable 
statutory formalities and owns a valid copyright.17 Second, the copyright 
holder must show that an accused infringer actually copied “constituent 
elements of the work that are original.”18 However, the burden of proof 
on the copyright holder may be lower than showing actual copying 
because legal copying “typically may be inferred from proof of access to 
the copyrighted work and ‘probative similarity.’”19
Of course, the accused infringer may try to present evidence showing 
that the portion of the copyrighted work taken is not worthy of copyright 
protection because it lacks originality.20 Additionally, the accused 
infringer could seek to justify the use of the copyrighted work as a fair 
use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, as described in the following section. 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 17. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). “In any judicial 
proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of 
the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated 
in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
 18. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. 
 19. Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 
F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
 20. The requirement for originality of copyrighted works is found in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the Constitution. 
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2. The advent of fair use 
Originally established in Folsom v. Marsh21 in 1841, the doctrine of 
fair use generally provides that certain uses of a copyrighted work may 
not infringe if the uses create a significantly greater public benefit. This 
exception has been important for educational institutions, libraries, and 
various other individuals that use copyrighted works in areas such as 
teaching, comment, criticism, and scholarship.22
The doctrine of fair use, officially codified in 197623 as 17 U.S.C. § 
107, sets out four factors to be considered in determining what 
constitutes a fair use: (1) the commercial nature, character, and purpose 
of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the copyrighted work that was used; and (4) “the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.”24 Courts use the factors set out in § 107 to determine whether or 
not an individual has engaged in a fair use of a copyrighted material.25 
For example, public libraries and schools may successfully invoke the 
 21. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (establishing fair use based on the 
“nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of 
the original work”). 
 22. See § 107 of the Copyright Act, which states as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
17 U.S.C. § 107. Many such groups have noticed the weakening of the fair use doctrine and have 
called for the preservation of fair use. See, e.g., CETUS, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 
available at http://www.cetus.org/fairindex.html (last visited October 28, 2003); see also NOW 
PLAYING: YOUR PRIVACY RIGHTS, available at http://www.protectfairuse.org/ 
consumers/now_playing.html (last visited October 28, 2003). 
 23. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5658, 5679–
80. 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS, available at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/copypol2.htm#test (last visited October 28, 2003) 
(stating that the inquiry should consist of the following four questions: “1. What is the character of 
the use? 2. What is the nature of the work to be used? 3. How much of the work will you use? 4. 
What effect would this use have on the market for the original or for permissions if the use were 
widespread?”). 
 25. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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fair use defense where the character of their use is academic, educational, 
and noncommercial.26
3. Reactions to the doctrine of fair use 
The digital fair use exception evokes contradictory reactions. At first 
blush, the thought that a purchaser may legally make archival copies of 
copyrighted music, software, or DVD’s may be uncomfortable. Such 
activities present the risk of permanently impairing the value of the 
copyrighted material, destroying the monetary investment the material 
represents, and ultimately discouraging development of and investment 
in such materials. 
Clearly, where a use in question does not qualify as a fair use, such 
as copying and distribution of music or software, the copyright holder 
can seek judicial intervention and appropriate damages proportional to 
the harm. Nevertheless, in cases where the copyright holder is harmed by 
a fair use, such as a negative book review or making a book widely 
available for the public in a library,27 the judicial policy of fair use wins 
out. The Ninth Circuit summarized this policy by stating: 
The copyright holder has a property interest in preventing others from 
reaping the fruits of his labor, not in preventing the authors and thinkers 
of the future from making use of, or building upon, his advances. The 
process of creation is often an incremental one, and advances building 
 26. Specific exceptions to copyright infringement are also provided for performances and 
displays made in an educational setting. See 17 U.S.C. § 110. Furthermore, on November 2, 2002, 
President George W. Bush signed into law the Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization 
Act, which “redefines the terms and conditions on which accredited, nonprofit educational 
institutions throughout the U.S. may use copyright protected materials in distance education—
including on websites and by other digital means—without permission from the copyright owner and 
without payment of royalties.” Kenneth D. Crews, New Copyright Law for Distance Education: The 
Meaning and Importance of the TEACH Act, available at 
http://www.ala.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Our_Association/Offices/ALA_Washington/Issues2/Co
pyright1/Distance_Education_and_the_TEACH_Act/teachsummary.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003). 
 27. Interestingly, there are very few drawbacks presented to software developers when a 
valid purchaser of their software simply protects their investment by making an archival copy. While 
there is a great potential for harm in allowing consumers to copy or modify software, unauthorized 
copying, selling, or other use may be prosecuted under copyright law. Of course, software 
developers may simply hope that consumers would be forced to repurchase damaged or lost 
software; however, such a result might seem unfair, especially given the nonthreatening nature of 
archival copying. 
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on past developments are far more common than radical new 
concepts.28
After weighing the prospective harms that such fair uses may have to the 
value of a copyrighted material, courts and Congress agree that such uses 
are justifiable under this policy and other considerations.29
This Comment asserts that through shrinkwrap licenses, software 
developers are able to circumvent the fair use exception and capture 
federally granted rights that rightly belong to the public. The following 
section introduces the climate surrounding copyright law in recent 
decades, the advent of shrinkwrap licenses, and congressional action 
taken to protect computer software. 
B. Shrinkwrap Licenses Were Created to Provide  
Greater Protection to Computer Software 
1. The climate in copyright law was not amicable to broad protection of 
computer software 
Software developers may have been disappointed by the judicial 
enforcement of copyright protection of computer software for several 
reasons. First, the judicial mood may not have been amicable to 
broadening copyright protection for software programs given the original 
intent of copyright purpose and policy. Second, with the advent of patent 
protection for computer programs, courts might have consciously 
decided that copyright law no longer provided an appropriate cause of 
action for violations of computer software. Finally, the advent of 
shrinkwrap licenses—which provide protection comparable to copyright 
law—might have persuaded courts that copyright protection for such 
software would be redundant. 
 28. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 29. In addition, the creation of alternative products in the market may increase competition, 
which has long been a hallmark of the economy. For example, alternative products may impel 
nonprice competition through warranties, enhanced service and support, etc. Such alternatives can 
benefit the consumer and the economy by encouraging competition, impeding antitrust violations, 
and encouraging further development and refinement of the products on the market. Finally, when an 
individual seeks to protect the idea through a patent, such protection may be available when 
appropriate. While a discussion of patent law provisions that allow computer software to be patented 
is beyond the scope of this paper, the reader may profit from other sources. See, e.g., BITLAW, 
SOFTWARE PATENT INDEX, available at http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/index.html (last 
visited October 28, 2003). 
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The judicial mood may have been unfavorable for an expansion of 
copyright protection over computer software, especially because 
copyright protects expression, not broad ideas.30 Copyright protection 
was limited to only the expression in the program and could not protect 
“the actual processes or methods embodied in the program.”31 Thus, 
eager software developers struggled to protect blossoming ideas from 
potential competitors and corral all financial benefit for themselves.32 In 
fact, the explosion of the computer industry in recent decades almost 
certainly caught courts unprepared, if not unwilling, to use copyright law 
to deal with emerging computer software technology. In 1975, 
representative of the judicial attitude prior to the software boom, the 
Supreme Court said that the Copyright Act should be construed in light 
of its basic purpose to enhance the public store of knowledge,33 which 
meant that information surrendered to the public domain could not be 
retrieved and granted protection under copyright law. According to this 
principle, copyright law would not protect an entire computer program if 
it contained copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements.34 Lawfully 
 30. Patent law protects ideas and methods while copyright law protects only the expression 
of those ideas or methods. This distinction is often referred to as the idea-expression dichotomy. The 
idea-expression dichotomy offers a very basic explanation of what subject matter is eligible for 
copyright protection. As stated in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000), “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.” For a more detailed analysis of the idea-expression 
dichotomy, see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(1), 
(B)(2)(a) (2000). 
 31. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding 
“that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, 
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of 
copyright law” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5667)). 
 32. A software developer could pursue patent protection for her idea, but it was not until 
1981 when the Supreme Court upheld patent protection for a computer program in Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Since that time, an increasing number of patents have been issued for 
computer programs. See Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the Proper 
Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, .85 NW. U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1991)
 33. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The court stated:  
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly . . . lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.” 
When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act 
must be construed in light of this basic purpose. 
Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
 34. Courts have developed several tests for copyright infringement that can be applied to 
computer programs. These tests help determine what, if any, of the computer program can qualify as 
protectable expression under copyright law. Such tests include: the idea-expression dichotomy, see, 
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then, unscrupulous competitors could decompile a copyrighted program 
and create a different expression thereof that performed an equivalent 
function.35 Without incurring the same developmental costs as the 
original software developer, competitors could backdoor a copyright and 
produce a rival product.36 Software developers wanted more—they 
wished to protect their software more broadly, but could not rely on 
copyright law to do so. 
The advent of patent protection for software programs might also 
have weakened corresponding copyright protection. In 1981, the 
Supreme Court reversed two of its prior decisions and held that computer 
software programs were eligible for patent protection.37 At this point, 
judicial opinion might have subtly shifted the burden of protecting 
computer software from copyright law to the shoulders of patent law, 
which could offer protection to ideas, not just the expression thereof.38 
Armed with the broader protection afforded by a patent, software 
developers would now be able to sue for infringement of their ideas and 
e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); the ordinary observer 
test, see, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990); look and feel, see, e.g., 
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2001); and the merger doctrine, see, e.g., 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). Nevertheless, cunning software developers could 
effectively create programs that overcome such tests. Therefore, software developers turned to the 
shrinkwrap license for greater protection.
 35. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
the court suggests that reverse engineering is acceptable only where the accused program is a “new 
work” that does not free ride on another’s creative efforts. “[R]everse engineering object code to 
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use[,]” but “fair use reproductions of 
a computer program must not exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of 
the work.” Id. Additionally, in order to invoke the fair use defense of reverse engineering, a 
defendant must be able show that he was in possession of an authorized copy of a literary work. See 
id. 
 36. While a competitor may still be liable for legal copying, there are numerous advantages 
that can be derived through decompilation and reverse engineering of competing programs. For one, 
a competitor may effectively reduce the head start derived by the original developer in capturing 
market share for a particular software program. Especially in the software industry, a critical 
component of success is whether a company is able to deliver its software to market before its 
competitors. 
 37. The previous decisions that held that computer software programs were not patentable 
were Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), which 
simply followed the decision in Gottschalk. Later, in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the 
court found that a computer software program is patentable unless it simply performs a calculation. 
 38. The author suggests that as software patents became increasingly popular in the 1980s, 
the courts began to see copyright law as the less-effective way for software developers to protect 
their software. While it seems unlikely that courts would treat certain claims preferentially, it would 
nevertheless be possible that the preferred means (i.e., patent protection) became the ideal means of 
protecting computer software in the eyes of the courts. 
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methods, not just for direct copying. Thus, with patent protection now 
available for software programs, courts may have begun to look to patent 
law in order to provide the broad protection urged by software 
developers. 
Copyright law’s scope of protection for computer software may have 
also been weakened when courts began to approve and uphold 
increasingly prevalent shrinkwrap licenses. An increasing reliance on 
shrinkwrap license provisions may have influenced courts to look less 
toward copyright law for protection of computer software;39 thus, 
copyright law’s power to protect computer software may have faded 
while contract law’s power increased.40
It appears that judicial opinion changed from an outright denial of 
shrinkwrap license validity41 to a complete acknowledgement of 
shrinkwrap validity without allowing preemption by analogous, 
conflicting copyright claims.42 As suggested above, this result may be 
due to the failure of copyright law to protect computer software as 
developers had hoped, coupled with the importance of such protection 
and the availability and ability of contract law to create that protection. 
Thus, a decreasing reliance on copyright law may have contributed to the 
atrophy of copyright protection for computer software. 
2. The advent of shrinkwrap licenses 
Software developers’ intense economic interest to protect their 
software and reduce the costs involved in “forming idiosyncratic 
 39. Although a more complete analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Comment, 
the author submits it is possible that the Copyright Act could have provided the kind of protection of 
computer programs that the DMCA and UCITA have provided. See infra Part IV for a useful 
explanation of how digital fair use can protect the interests of worried software developers. 
 40. Several court decisions support this idea. The trend, evidenced by decisions of several 
courts, shows that courts slowly moved away from outright denial of the validity of shrinkwrap 
licenses toward a complete support of such licenses. Given such momentum, courts later began to 
find that federal copyright law did not preempt shrinkwrap licenses. While not explicit, this shift 
may have resulted due to the efforts of computer software developers to find protection beyond the 
moorings of copyright law. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d 
Cir. 1991) and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) 
as examples of early cases finding shrinkwrap licenses invalid. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) and Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
as examples of the recent judicial trend towards general support of shrinkwrap licenses. 
 41. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 
1988) (Vault II); Ariz. Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. 759. 
 42. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., 846 F. 
Supp. 208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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agreements” led to the creation and enforcement of shrinkwrap 
licenses.43 Without some form of additional protection for their 
investment,44 developers would not likely embark upon the creation of 
heavily researched and highly developed programs. Therefore, in the 
early 1990s, computer software developers sought protection under the 
blanket of state contract law via shrinkwrap licenses. 
Typically, a shrinkwrap license is prominently displayed on the 
outside of computer software packaging. In some circumstances, a 
consumer is unable to open the software without unwrapping the words 
of the licensing agreement45—including phrases such as “OPENING 
THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE INDICATES YOUR ACCEPTANCE 
OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STATED IN THE LICENSE 
AGREEMENT IN USER’S MANUAL.”46 Alternatively, while 
installing software, a consumer might be presented with a licensing 
agreement that must be accepted in order to complete installation of the 
software.47 Should the consumer opt not to agree to the licensing 
 43. Shrinkwrap license agreements not only provide software developers with the ability to 
enforce strict rights, but such licenses also decrease the costs of administering agreements with each 
individual consumer. See Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The 
Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 39 (2000). 
 44. According to the Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2002, Congress found that in 
2001 alone, the software industry lost a breathtaking $1.8 billion dollars due to software piracy. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-5057 at 2 (2002) (providing the congressional findings regarding the costs of 
intellectual property infringement according to different sectors), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills& 
docid=f:h5057ih.txt.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003). Additionally, the Business Software 
Alliance reported that software piracy cost the United States over 100,000 jobs, over $5.3 billion in 
wages, and over $1.4 billion in tax revenues in 2001 and again in 2002. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, SOFTWARE PIRACY AND THE LAW, SOFTWARE PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, available 
at http://www.bsa.org/resources/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/ security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1230 
(last visited October 28, 2003); BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, U.S. STATE SOFTWARE PIRACY 
STUDY, available at http://global.bsa.org/ statestudy/ (last visited October 28, 2003). 
 45. Under contract law, a shrinkwrap license must either provide all of the material terms to 
the contract in the words of the shrinkwrap license itself or clearly and unequivocally incorporate by 
reference another document wherein the terms of the license may be found. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209–12 (1978). For a discussion of the validity of shrinkwrap licenses 
under contract law, see Kell Corrigan Mercer, Note, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: Consumer Shrink-Wrap 
Licenses and Public Domain Materials: Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code 
Validity in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287 (1997). 
 46. This phrase, used for the Statement of License of Professor Kayton’s 2002 PTO 
ExamWare CD-Rom, Version 3.4, is printed on a small, narrow tape strip that seals the CD case 
closed. This tape strip must be broken before the user can install the software. 
 47. This sort of licensing agreement, performed while installing the software, is commonly 
referred to as a “clickwrap” agreement. Clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements are presented at 
different times, but are otherwise substantially similar. See supra note 1. 
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agreement, the software often instructs the consumer to return the 
software for a refund.48
 
a. Shrinkwrap licenses have been heavily criticized. Shrinkwrap 
licenses have not only created greater protection for computer software, 
but have also invited intense debate.49 Shrinkwrap licenses have been 
deemed good and bad for several reasons. Shrinkwrap licenses are 
valuable because they cut down the time otherwise required to 
individually contract with each consumer, provide a favorable and 
uniform agreement for the developer, and allow developers additional 
protection for their software. Nevertheless, shrinkwrap licenses have also 
been criticized for many reasons. First, many have questioned the 
validity of shrinkwrap licenses under the strictures of contract law itself, 
arguing that there is no assent or consideration as traditionally required 
for contract formation.50 Second, shrinkwrap licenses might be contracts 
of adhesion because the consumer has no ability to negotiate the terms of 
the contract; as such, shrinkwrap licenses would be invalid.51 Others 
have argued that where shrinkwrap licenses provide rights that contradict 
the Copyright Act, federal law should preempt the state contract claim.52 
Additionally, as this Comment contends, breach of contract claims based 
on shrinkwrap licenses should be preempted by federal copyright law 
because they do not embody an extra element of bargain and are 
therefore indistinguishable from the rights enumerated in § 106 of the 
Copyright Act. 
 48. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 256 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault 
II) (stating that the purchaser of the software should return the software for a refund if the purchaser 
chose not to assent to the terms of the license). 
 49. See Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Licenses: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 99 (1999); Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: The End Does Not Justify 
the Means in Federal Copyright Analysis, 1998 BYU L. REV. 303 (1998); Mercer, supra note 45, at 
1320; Goodman, supra note 11. 
 50. See Founds, supra note 49, at 101 & n.8, 102–03. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Tolman, supra note 49. Tolman’s piece argues that the ProCD court improperly 
found that ProCD’s state contract law claims were not preempted by federal copyright law because 
the ProCD agreement sought to protect unprotectable information and thus conflicted with federal 
copyright law. This Comment suggests that the extra element of bargain, relied on by several courts 
to distinguish breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from federal copyright claims, 
is improper because shrinkwrap licenses are not negotiated contracts. 
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After a very cold reception to shrinkwrap licenses,53 courts now find 
them generally enforceable.54 Additionally, some courts have found that 
provisions in shrinkwrap licenses that contradict copyright law principles 
were not preempted by copyright law.55 Indicative of the increasing 
support for shrinkwrap licenses, several groups rallied behind the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act56 (UCITA), later 
referred to as Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).57 
Article 2B supports validation of “mass-market licenses” such as 
shrinkwrap licenses.58 However, Article 2B’s support of shrinkwrap 
 53. Courts initially reacted unfavorably when considering the validity of shrinkwrap licenses. 
See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that a box top 
license disclaiming all prior oral representations was invalid because it materially altered the terms 
of the agreement entered into over the phone); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. 
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding that a license was invalid because there was no express assent to 
the terms of the license). 
 54. Shrinkwrap licenses are now generally accepted as enforceable by courts. ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a shrinkwrap license forbidding commercial 
use of the software was enforceable); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 
328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding enforceable a clickwrap license that did not create an undue 
hardship on the licensee or materially change the terms of previously-entered-into contracts). In 
ProCD, the Seventh Circuit focused on U.C.C. section 2-204 to support the conclusion that the 
offeror, as the master of the offer, can specify what type of conduct by the buyer denotes acceptance 
(in the case of a shrinkwrap, acceptance would be use without returning the software), and thereby 
incorporate the terms of the shrinkwrap license into the agreement. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450–55. 
Ultimately, the ProCD ruling has created a very low bar for shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses 
to pass—“the absence of a timely rejection [is] sufficient to show assent.” I.Lan Sys., Inc., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d at 337. In other words, implicit assent is sufficient to bind the purchaser. Id. at 338 (“If 
ProCD was correct to enforce a shrinkwrap license agreement, where any assent is implicit, then it 
must also be correct to enforce a clickwrap license agreement, where the assent is explicit.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that 
the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not preempted by federal copyright law); ProCD, 
86 F.3d at 1447 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not preempted by 
federal copyright law). 
 56. See UCITA, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UcitaFinal 
100.pdf.htm (last visited October 29, 2003); see also MARK K. ANDERSON, NOW, UCITA . . . LATER, 
YOU DON’T, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/03/07/ ucita.idg/ (last visited 
October 29, 2003) (summarizing the arguments of many critics of UCITA). 
 57. See U.C.C. § 2B (Proposed Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
library/ulc/ucc2b/zb299,htm. 
 58. It is unsurprising that these changes in the law were proposed by numerous interested 
parties. Given the plight of the computer software industry, the writing was on the wall. According 
to some sources, Article 2B was heavily funded by the software industry. See, e.g., CHRISTY 
HUDGINS-BONAFIELD, UCC 2B: THE NEW LAW OF SHRINK-WRAP, available at 
http://www.networkcomputing.com/1008/1008f1side7.html (last visited October 29, 2003); see also 
William J. Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the United States—How the Uniform Commercial 
Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453 (1999); JAMES S. HUGGINS, UCITA: UNIFORM 
COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT, available at 
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validation is subject to the condition that a license not be 
unconscionable.59 Additionally, Article 2B only supports shrinkwrap 
licenses insofar as they are not preempted by federal legislation.60 
Although many groups applaud the growing support for shrinkwrap 
licenses, such changes threaten the digital fair use doctrine. 
 
b. Shrinkwrap licenses limit the digital fair use and first sale 
doctrines, thus prohibiting otherwise legal uses of a copyrighted work. 
Shrinkwrap licenses often conflict61 with the doctrines of fair use, first 
sale, and reverse engineering,62 a category of fair use. A normal 
shrinkwrap license agreement seeks to prohibit the licensee from 
engaging in certain activities that would otherwise be lawful under 
patent, copyright, or trade secret law. Representative of terms commonly 
http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita.htm (last visited October 29, 2003) (listing the 
proponents and opponents of UCITA). 
 59. See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent 
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 798 
(1999). 
 60. See UCITA § 105(a) (Proposed Official Draft 2000), available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.pdf (last visited October 29, 2003) (“A provision of this [Act] which 
is preempted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.”); see also Pratik A. 
Shah, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 105 
(2000). 
 61. See Founds, supra note 49 (discussing the interaction of the then new terms of UCITA 
and their interplay with existing copyright law, especially regarding digital fair use, the first sale 
doctrine, and reverse engineering). 
 62. Reverse engineering may be broadly defined as the process by which an individual 
disassembles an invention to determine what the components are and how the components 
interrelate. The individual then recreates the invention in a subtly different way so that it is not an 
exact copy of the original. In so doing, the individual can exclude protected aspects of the original 
invention and thereby create a noninfringing device. Through reverse engineering, software 
purchasers may decompile a computer program and create a program that is functionally equivalent 
to the decompiled program. 
The doctrine of reverse engineering is consistent with the goals of copyright law because it 
allows individuals to build on previous inventions, thereby promoting the progress of science. See 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The purpose and 
policy behind allowing reverse engineering as a lawful fair use (providing exemption from what 
could otherwise be a copyright violation), is summarized in Atari when the court states: 
The copyright holder has a property interest in preventing others from reaping the 
fruits of his labor, not in preventing the authors and thinkers of the future from 
making use of, or building upon, his advances. The process of creation is often an 
incremental one, and advances building on past developments are far more common 
than radical new concepts. 
Id. at 843 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 1992)); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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found in shrinkwrap licenses, the license in Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd.63 (the Vault license) forces the user to agree not to 
“transfer, sublicense, rent, lease, convey, copy, modify, translate, convert 
to another programming language, decompile or disassemble the 
Licensed Software for any purpose without VAULT’s prior written 
consent.”64 However, the fair use doctrine allows a user to copy, modify, 
translate, convert, decompile, or disassemble the software in certain 
circumstances; furthermore, under the first sale doctrine discussed below, 
a user can also lawfully transfer, sublicense, rent, lease, or convey the 
software.65 This subsection will analyze the Vault license under these 
two doctrines. 
Shrinkwrap licenses often prohibit several fair uses. While the Vault 
license forbids copying, modification, conversion, decompilation, 
disassembly, and translation of the software, these activities can qualify 
as fair uses under the fair use exception.66 Additionally, the Vault 
shrinkwrap license prohibits any public performance, which may also 
qualify as a fair use.67 The Vault license also expressly precludes the 
reverse engineering of computer software through decompilation or 
disassembly; this blanket prohibition against reverse engineering directly 
contradicts decisions set out by several courts.68
 63. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II). 
 64. Id. at 257 n.2. 
 65. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1247 (1995) (discussing the conflict of shrinkwrap licensing agreements with the fair use and 
first sale doctrines). 
 66. Fair use, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, was initially created to help protect public interests 
realized through use of a copyrighted work that would otherwise be illegal were it not for the nature 
of the use. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843 (“Where the infringement is small in relation to the new work 
created, the fair user is profiting largely from his own creative efforts rather than free-riding on 
another’s work. A prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of ideas without 
serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.” (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 
307 n.6)); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(considering the “public benefit” made available through unauthorized use of a copyrighted work); 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (determining that the defendant had 
engaged in a “justifiable use” of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work). Although courts have sought to 
establish a list of “fair uses,” this doctrine has nevertheless been classified as “the most troublesome 
in the whole law of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 67. Additionally, certain public performances may be exempted from copyright infringement 
under § 110 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000). 
 68. The Ninth Circuit upheld the fair use defense of reverse engineering in Sony Computer 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, Connectix copied Sony’s 
PlayStation BIOS in order to reverse engineer the PlayStation and create a noninfringing video game 
system that could function with PlayStation game discs. Id. at 598–99; see also Atari, 975 F.2d at 
843. Indicative perhaps of the recognition of case law, some shrinkwrap licenses implicitly 
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Finally, shrinkwrap licenses have also been criticized for restrictions 
created by circumventing the first sale doctrine. Under the first sale 
doctrine, the “sale” of computer software transfers to the owner the right 
to transfer, resell, or otherwise dispose of the program;69 § 117 of the 
Copyright Act also allows the owner to make copies of the software in 
order to properly utilize or archive the software.70 Craftily, however, 
software developers are able to circumvent the first sale doctrine because 
the purchase of software is not a “sale”—through shrinkwrap licenses, 
software developers condition the use of the software upon a purchaser’s 
acceptance of a mere license to the product.71 For example, under the 
terms of the Vault license, the purchaser is really a licensee—thus, she is 
not allowed to rent, lease, transfer, or copy the software. 
Courts and scholars continue to dispute the virtues of shrinkwrap 
licenses. The following part addresses the judicial debate and asserts that 
copyright law should preempt breach of contract claims based on 
shrinkwrap licenses under § 301 of the Copyright Act. 
recognize that reverse engineering may be legal under federal law. For example, the license 
accompanying RealNetworks’ RealOne Player states: “You may not: . . . modify, translate, reverse 
engineer, decompile, disassemble (except to the extent that this restriction is expressly prohibited by 
law) . . . .” See REALNETWORKS, INC., END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, RealNetworks Products, 
available at http:// www.ncns.com/RealNetworksLicense.html (last visited November 3, 2003). 
 69. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of 
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”). Additionally, § 109(b) states that it is illegal for  
any person in possession of a particular copy of a computer program[,] . . . for the 
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, [to] dispose of, or authorize the 
disposal of, the . . . computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act 
or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending. 
Id. § 109(b). 
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 117. While § 117 refers to copying a program so that it may be properly 
utilized, many courts have found that licensees are not “owners” under § 117, and that § 117 does 
not allow licensees the right of unauthorized use. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 
991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing an owner of software from a licensee and 
finding that § 117 does not apply to licensees because the software is licensed and not sold); 
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 
1994); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992). Nevertheless, 
some courts have applied § 117 without distinguishing between licensees and owners. See, e.g., 
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II); Foresight Res. Corp. v. 
Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009–10 (D. Kan. 1989). 
 71. UCITA has verified that the sale of computer software will only amount to a grant of 
license and not of ownership. See Draft of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citaam99.pdf (last visited October 29, 2003). 
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III. THE JUDICIAL DEBATE CONTINUES: SHOULD FEDERAL COPYRIGHT 
LAW PREEMPT SHRINKWRAP LICENSE PROVISIONS? 
The judicial and scholarly debate continues as to whether copyright 
law preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses. 
Courts and scholars alike have suggested that shrinkwrap licenses are 
preempted through (1) express preemption under § 301 of the Copyright 
Act and (2) conflict preemption due to state law’s conflict with federal 
law and the goals and purposes of federal copyright law.72 Although 
shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable,73 the preemption debate 
continues. Currently, courts disagree as to whether federal copyright law 
preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses.74 
 72. The Third Circuit in Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp. stated: 
  The Supreme Court has recognized three ways in which federal law may preempt, 
and thereby displace, state law: (1) “express preemption,” (2) “field preemption” (which 
is also sometimes referred to as “implied preemption”), or (3) “conflict preemption.” 
Express preemption arises when there is an explicit statutory command that state law be 
displaced. . . . 
  Under field or implied preemption principles, state law may be displaced “if federal 
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” 
  Finally, state law may be displaced under conflict preemption principles if the state 
law in question presents a conflict with federal law in one of two situations: when it is 
impossible to comply with both the state and the federal law or when the state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.” 
189 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). Because copyright law has 
granted state law the right to concurrently occupy the field, only the first and third avenues for 
preemption are useful. Many scholars have commented on various strategies of preemption. See 
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet: Federal 
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Mercer, supra 
note 45; see, e.g., Vault II, 847 F.2d at 270 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was 
preempted by federal copyright law); ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), 
rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 73. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that a 
shrinkwrap license was not preempted by federal copyright law), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 
(2003); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not 
preempted by federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a 
shrinkwrap license did not involve any extra element of bargain and would therefore be preempted 
by copyright law). 
Certainly, it would not be appropriate to assume that copyright law has no preemptive power. 
In fact, as Judge Dyk noted in his dissent in Bowers, “ProCD and the other contract cases are also 
careful not to create a blanket rule that all contracts will escape preemption.” Bowers, 320 F.3d at 
1338 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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Section A argues that preemption under § 301 of the Copyright Act is 
proper because breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses 
do not embody an extra element that distinguishes them from copyright 
claims. Section B argues that preemption of such contract claims is 
supported by the conflict preemption analysis in order to preserve the 
important policies embodied in the digital fair use doctrine. 
A. Preemption Analysis Under § 301 of the Copyright Act and the Extra 
Element Test in Shrinkwrap Licenses 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law when the rights 
created by that law are equivalent to those protected by copyright law.75 
Section 301 provides that neither common law nor state law may entitle a 
person to any right “within the subject matter of copyright as specified 
by sections 102 and 103” that is “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright” under § 106.76
Therefore, in order for federal copyright law to preempt a breach of 
contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license agreement, the contract 
claim must meet a two-pronged test. First, the contract claim must 
involve a class of works, as defined by § 102 or § 103 of the Copyright 
Act, which could qualify for copyright protection.77 Second, the contract 
 75. The federal report states the following:  
The evolving common law rights of “privacy,” “publicity,” and trade secrets, and the 
general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes of 
action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or 
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.  
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748. 
 76. Section 301 provides: 
(a) [A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright 
as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and 
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no 
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State. 
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or 
statutes of any State with respect to— 
  . . . . 
  (3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(3) (2000). 
77. Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides that in general: 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
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claim must involve “legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to 
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106.”78 Courts do not normally struggle with the 
first prong; however, the determination of equivalency is still debated. 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include the following categories: 
  (1) literary works;  
   (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;  
   (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;  
   (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;  
   (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;  
   (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;  
   (7) sound recordings; and  
   (8) architectural works.  
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work. 
17 U.S.C. § 102. Section 103 provides: 
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations 
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in 
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such 
material has been used unlawfully. 
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material 
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting 
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the 
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not 
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright 
protection in the preexisting material. 
17 U.S.C. § 103. 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3). Section 106 provides that: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:  
  (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;  
  (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;  
  (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
  (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; 
  (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted 
work publicly; and 
  (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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The debate has focused on whether the rights protected in 
shrinkwrap licenses are equivalent to those enumerated in § 106 of the 
Copyright Act. The rights prohibited by a typical shrinkwrap license 
include copying, modifying, reverse engineering, decompiling, 
transferring, or having public performance of the software. The second 
prong of the preemption analysis asks whether those prohibited rights are 
equivalent to the rights under § 106 (already vested in the copyright 
holder) such as copying, preparation of derivative works, distribution, 
public performance, and public display.79 At first blush, the typical 
shrinkwrap license mentioned above is a candidate for preemption 
because it protects rights that are equivalent to many, if not all of the § 
106 rights. Although many courts have found that copyright law can 
preempt conflicting breach of contract claims,80 several courts have 
found that it cannot.81 Courts concluding that copyright law could not 
preempt breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses have 
done so by distinguishing federal copyright claims from contract claims 
using the extra element test.82
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 80. See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993); Worth v. 
Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144 (D. Md. 1995); Patrick v. 
Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Artie Fields Prods. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1994 WL 559331 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Perro v. Wemco, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1475, 1994 WL 382590 (E.D. La. 1994); Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. 
Tex. 1994); Gemcraft Homes Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tex. 1988); see also Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II) (finding that a provision 
in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was 
preempted by federal copyright law because it touched upon an area of federal copyright law, the 
preemption of which in turn preempted the shrinkwrap license relying on the Louisiana Act). 
 81. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that a 
shrinkwrap license was not preempted by federal copyright law), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 
(2003); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the shrinkwrap license 
involved was valid and was not preempted by federal copyright law). 
 82. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1342–43 (holding that federal copyright law did not preempt a 
breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license because the extra element of bargain 
distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453–54 (finding that 
the state contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license had an extra element and was not preempted 
by federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license did not 
involve any extra element of bargain and therefore would be preempted by copyright law). 
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1. The extra element test in ProCD v. Zeidenberg,83 Information 
Handling Services. v. LRP Publications, Inc.,84 and Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies85
The extra element test86 has been employed by many courts to 
determine whether state rights are equivalent to, and thus preempted by, 
rights granted to copyright holders under § 106 of the Copyright Act.87 
Under this test, a state claim is not equivalent to a copyright claim if the 
contract claim requires an accuser to show an element that is superfluous 
to the copyright claim.88 For example, if the state claim requires that a 
fiduciary relationship exist between the parties—an element not required 
for the copyright infringement claim—the extra element of the fiduciary 
relationship makes the state claim different from and not preempted by 
the copyright claim.89 Thus, a “state law claim is not preempted if the 
 83. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447. 
 84. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 85. 320 F.3d 1317. 
 86. It appears that Professor Melville Nimmer was very influential in developing the “extra 
element” test.  See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 
rev’d on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing MELVIN B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B) at 1-7 n.22, 1-11 (1978)); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B)(1) (2003) (explaining the development of the extra 
element test and citing courts that coined the phrase and used the test). 
 87. Courts have applied the extra element test in various circumstances. See, e.g., Wrench 
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the extra element of a promise to 
pay for the use of the work distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim); Samara Bros. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the extra element of “intentional deception” 
in distinguishing an unfair trade practice claim from a copyright claim); United States ex rel. Berge 
v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding preemption of an intellectual property 
conversion claim because breach of trust in a relationship and harm received due to the alleged 
violation were not extra elements that distinguished the conversion claim from a copyright claim); 
Harolds Stores v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the extra element 
was a “restraint of trade”); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying 
the extra element test and finding that the breach of contract claim involved was preempted by 
copyright law because it did not contain an extra element that distinguished it from copyright law); 
Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
the extra element was a restriction on use of the licensed program that did not involve rights found in 
§ 106); Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the extra 
element of fraud distinguished the state law claim from a copyright claim). 
 88. A successful copyright claim will typically require an accuser to show that the accused 
party has infringed on the accuser’s exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under § 106 of the 
Copyright Act. 
 89. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716–18 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]f 
an ‘extra element’ is ‘required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, 
distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not 
SMI-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 11:31:28 AM 
1373] The Shrinkwrap Snafu 
 1395 
 
‘extra element’ changes the ‘nature of the action so that it is qualitatively 
different from a copyright infringement claim.’”90 Although numerous 
courts have turned to the extra element in relation to state claims 
generally,91 only a few courts have used the extra element test in 
analyzing breach of contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses.92
For example, in ProCD,93 the Seventh Circuit held that a two-party 
contract based on a shrinkwrap license was not preempted by copyright 
law. Even though the court did not use the term “extra element,” it found 
that the contract claim was not equivalent to the rights within the general 
scope of copyright because the contract required an extra element of 
bargain.94 As a result, the court concluded that “a simple two-party 
contract is not ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 
general scope of copyright’ and therefore may be enforced.”95 However, 
the court carefully “refrain[ed] from adopting a rule [establishing] that 
anything with the label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the preemption 
clause.”96 The court then narrowly confined the application of the 
holding to “shrinkwrap licenses of the kind before us.”97
lie “within the general scope of copyright,” and there is no preemption.’” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B), at 1-1415 (1991))). 
 90. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 716 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mayer v. Josiah 
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); see also Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 91. See supra note 89. 
 92. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that 
federal copyright law did not preempt a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license 
because the extra element of bargain distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim), cert. 
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453–54 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that the breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license did not create rights 
equivalent to those protected under copyright law and was not preempted by federal copyright law); 
Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that 
a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license was qualitatively different from a copyright 
claim because of defendant’s deceptive representations). 
 93. In ProCD, the software developer discriminated in its pricing for software based on 
commercial and noncommercial use. The accused purchased software designated for noncommercial 
purposes, which cost less and was accompanied by a shrinkwrap license that prohibited the 
commercial use of the software. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
 94. See id. at 1454. 
 95. Id. at 1455. 
 96. Id. The ProCD court also mentioned that “National Car Rental likewise recognizes the 
possibility that some applications of the law of contract could interfere with the attainment of 
national objectives and therefore come within the domain of § 301(a).” Id. 
 97. Id. 
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In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,98 the Federal Circuit also found 
that the breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license was not 
preempted by copyright law. The court reasoned that the breach of 
contract claim contained the same extra element as found in ProCD: the 
shrinkwrap license was a “private contractual agreement[] supported by 
mutual assent and consideration.”99 The court also stated that “no 
evidence suggests the First Circuit would extend [the holding in Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.100 allowing preemption of conflicting state 
law] to include private contractual agreements supported by mutual 
assent and consideration.”101
However, many disagree that bargain is actually present in 
shrinkwrap licenses. In his dissent in Bowers, Judge Dyk suggests that 
shrinkwrap contracts do not involve the bargain element because “[l]ike 
any other contract of adhesion, the only choice offered to the purchaser is 
to avoid making the purchase in the first place.”102 While conceding that 
parties are free to contract away a fair use defense if the contract is freely 
negotiated, Judge Dyk asserts that shrinkwrap licenses are not freely 
negotiated contracts.103 Judge Dyk argues that as a result of shrinkwrap 
contracts, a state may inappropriately eliminate federal law by 
eviscerating the fair use defense.104 Professor Nimmer also warns against 
this: “If copyright law is to maintain an autonomous existence, instead of 
becoming an adjunct to whatever lawyers can draft into shrinkwrap 
‘contracts,’ then its delicate balance must be respected.”105
 98. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. 
Ct. 2588 (2003). The defendant in Bowers purchased software from the plaintiff which contained a 
shrinkwrap license provision prohibiting reverse engineering of the software. Nevertheless, the 
defendant reverse engineered the software and sold a nearly identical product. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1325. The court’s language, “mutual assent and consideration,” has been simplified 
to the term “bargain” throughout this Comment. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY suggests that these two 
terms can be combined. “Bargain” is defined therein as, “An agreement between parties for the 
exchange of promises or performances.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis 
added). “Assent” is defined as “Agreement, approval, or permission.” Id. at 88. “Consideration” is 
defined as “Something of value . . . received by a promisor from a promisee.” Id. at 245. The 
combination of these terms is therefore reasonable. 
 100. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II) (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License 
Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was preempted by federal 
copyright law because it touched upon an area of federal copyright law). 
 101. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325. 
 102. Id. at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1336–37 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 105. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04(B)(3)(a) 
(2003) (discussing the many arguments against the holding of ProCD and its practical effects). 
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Although several courts have relied on the extra element test to 
distinguish breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from 
copyright claims, there are many reasons to question the logic and the 
result. As shown below, shrinkwrap licenses do not involve the bargain 
element relied on by these courts. Additionally, Congress intended § 301 
to wield broad preemptive power in situations such as this, where the 
claims are substantively equivalent and where precluding preemption 
results in the dissolution of federal law. 
2. Refocusing the judicial debate: The extra element test in light of the 
legislative purposes of § 301 
Ultimately, the judicial debate regarding preemption should be 
refocused because § 301 contemplates rights, rather than claims, and 
supports preemption in borderline areas where contract law might 
frustrate the purposes of federal copyright law. It follows that 
distinguishing contract claims from copyright claims using the extra 
element test conflicts with § 301.106 This is clarified by resorting to the 
legislative history of § 301, which courts have analyzed in determining 
whether § 301 supports or undermines preemption of breach of contract 
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses.107 At the center of the judicial 
debate are the differences between the version of § 301 submitted to 
Congress by the United States House of Representatives and the version 
of § 301 submitted by the United States Senate.108 The Senate’s version 
of § 301 enumerated certain rights that the Copyright Act could not 
preempt, which enumeration included breach of contract claims.109 
However, the House’s proposed version excluded breach of contract 
claims from the list of rights that could not be preempted by the 
Copyright Act. In the end, Congress adopted the House’s version.110
One interpretation of Congress’s preference for the House’s version 
of § 301 suggests that Congress wanted § 301 to have preemptive power 
 106. See infra Part IV for an analysis under conflict preemption of how shrinkwrap licenses 
contravene the purposes of copyright law. 
 107. See Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 435, 440–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(citing numerous authorities recognizing the confusing legislative history of § 301). 
 108. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5819; Mercer, supra note 45, at 1305–06 (discussing the legislative history of § 301). 
 109. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5819. This enumeration of rights is found in § 301(b)(3). 
 110. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
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over breach of contract claims.111 Thus, courts would not be justified in 
disallowing preemption of otherwise equivalent contract claims simply 
because an extra element was involved.112 A worthwhile distinction is 
noted in that the extra element test focuses on distinguishing breach of 
contract claims from copyright claims while the House report focuses on 
rights.113 This distinction was not addressed in either ProCD or Bowers. 
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning, which assumes that rights protected 
by copyright law should have a broad scope of equivalence, is supported 
by the House report of § 301.114
The House report states that copyright law should preempt any state 
right that is equivalent to a right under copyright: “The intention of 
section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law 
or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright.”115 The legislative 
history adds the following: 
The declaration of this principle in section 301 is intended to be stated 
in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to 
foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention 
that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of 
any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.116
 111. See id. § 301(a), (b)(3); see also Tolman, supra note 49, at 324 (discussing the 
implications of the legislative history with regard to preemption of breach of contract claims). 
 112. While courts have found different kinds of extra elements that have distinguished state 
claims from copyright claims, see supra notes 87 and 92, this Comment asserts that the extra 
element of “bargain,” as discussed in Bowers and Information Handling Services, is not present in 
breach of contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses. 
 113. The implication of a distinction between “rights” and “claims” in the shrinkwrap license 
context may be significant. First, a “claim” may require several elements, such as the claim in 
Samara Bros. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), which required intentional deception 
and intentional copying. Thus, in the context of the “extra element” test, a “claim” requires an 
additional act, distinct and separate from an act described in § 106 of the Copyright Act. § 106 
“rights” include acts of reproduction, preparing derivative works, public performance and 
distribution, and equivalents thereof. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Importantly, § 301 refers only to “rights” 
(not claims) that are “within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . .” Id. § 
301(a). Therefore, despite the extra element required by a claim, if the claim includes a right 
enumerated in § 106, the House Report might suggest that this claim ought to be preempted by 
copyright law. While such a result would require changes in the prosecution of lawsuits, it would not 
eviscerate legal remedies for persons possessing copyrighted material. The full implication of a 
claim-right distinction beyond the context of shrinkwrap licenses is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. However, the author submits that this distinction is necessarily limited only to areas 
involving § 301 of the Copyright Act. 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746–47. 
 115. Id. at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746. 
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 Further, courts should assume that the rights protected by copyright 
law are very broad in scope:117
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter 
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from 
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright 
because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because 
it has fallen into the public domain.118
 Several courts have followed these principles in finding that 
copyright law preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap 
contracts.119 For example, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,120 the 
Fifth Circuit found that a provision in the Louisiana License Act 
prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was 
preempted by federal copyright law because it “‘touched upon [an] area’ 
of federal copyright law.”121 Vault sought to enforce its shrinkwrap 
license, which provided that “you may not . . . copy, modify, translate, 
convert to another programming language, decompile, or 
disassemble.”122 Under the Louisiana Software License Enforcement 
Act, Vault was permitted to prohibit decompilation or disassembly of a 
 117. Many courts have given copyright law a broad scope when determining whether state-
created rights were equivalent to rights protected under copyright law and have found preemption of 
state law. See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993); Worth v. 
Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144 (D. Md. 1995); Patrick v. 
Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Artie Fields Prods. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1994 WL 559331 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Perro v. Wemco, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1475, 1994 WL 382590 (E.D. La. 1994); Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. 
Tex. 1994); Gemcraft Homes Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747. 
 119. For example, in Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, the Federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a claim based on Pennsylvania law was 
preempted by federal copyright law because where the two are in conflict, “the Supremacy Clause is 
decisive.” 520 F. Supp. 971, 993 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d 
808 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(Vault II) (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or 
decompilation of a computer program was preempted by federal copyright law because it touched 
upon an area of federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a 
shrinkwrap license would not be preempted by copyright law), later proceeding at 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15904 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2001). 
 120. Vault II, 847 F.2d at 269. 
 121. Id. (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987) 
(Vault I)). 
 122. Id. at 257 n.2. 
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licensed computer program.123 The court found that because the 
Louisiana Act “‘touched upon the area’ of federal copyright law, its 
provisions were preempted and Vault’s license agreement was 
unenforceable.”124 The court supported its decision by noting that “the 
Supreme Court held that ‘[w]hen state law touches upon the area of 
[patent or copyright statutes], it is “familiar doctrine” that the federal 
policy “may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied” by the state 
law.’”125
Thus, the Supreme Court and others have recognized that the 
legislative intent was not to preclude preemption of breach of contract 
claims, but was in fact meant to preempt breach of contract claims that 
dealt with rights within the scope of those rights protected under the 
copyright act.126 Although Bowers and ProCD found that between 
private parties,127 the extra element of bargain allegedly distinguished 
the contract claim from a copyright claim, this extra element is not 
present in shrinkwrap licenses. Not only is this extra element absent from 
shrinkwrap licenses, but § 301’s contemplation of rights, rather than 
claims, supports preemption in borderline areas where contract law might 
frustrate the purposes of federal copyright law. 
 123. Id. at 269. 
 124. Id. (quoting Vault I, 655 F. Supp. at 763). 
 125. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
229 (1964)) (citation omitted). 
 126. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (“Establishment 
of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here 
given the Act’s express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly preempting 
state statutory and common-law copyright regulation.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 228 
(stating that federal policy cannot be set at naught). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, wherein the court stated that allowing states to  
expand the perimeters of copyright protection to their own liking, on the theory that 
preemption would be no bar to state protection of material not meeting federal statutory 
standards . . . would run directly afoul of one of the Act’s central purposes, to “avoid the 
development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.”  
723 F.2d 195, 199–200 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.) 
 127. The court uses the word “private” to describe the shrinkwrap license agreement. See 
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003). As 
ProCD mentioned, “A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect 
only their parties. . . .” ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). This distinction is 
not probative because, as argued herein, where shrinkwrap licenses are unconscionable, there is no 
assent and no contract is formed. Nevertheless, this Comment asserts that there is no bargain, 
whether private or not, present in shrinkwrap licenses. 
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3. Distinguishing Bowers and ProCD: Shrinkwrap licenses do not 
embody an extra element 
Even assuming, arguendo, that preemption is properly determined by 
applying the extra element test, breach of contract claims based on 
shrinkwrap license agreements do not embody the extra element of 
bargain as Bowers and ProCD suggest.128 First, this extra element is 
absent because shrinkwrap licenses are contracts of adhesion that offer 
no opportunity for bargaining.129 Second, this extra element is absent 
because contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses are 
unconscionable. Additionally, this extra element is illusory because it is 
possible to tenuously construe any transaction as embodying bargain or 
an implied agreement. Finally, perpetuation of this extra element 
improperly empowers state law in a “vague borderline area” where 
Congress intended federal law to dominate. 
Shrinkwrap licenses do not embody the extra element of bargain 
because they are contracts of adhesion.130 An adhesion contract is 
a standardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and 
services essentially on a “take it or leave it” basis, without affording the 
consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain, and under such conditions 
that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service except 
by acquiescing to the form of the contract.131
 128. Garry L. Founds argues that such an argument is implausible; his concerns are addressed 
below. See Founds, supra note 49, at 108 (stating that because shrinkwrap contracts are generally 
enforceable as implied contracts, they should not be treated any differently than any other negotiated 
agreement). 
 129. While this argument may appear to mix state law principles with federal law principles, 
the extra element analysis necessarily invokes such a discussion where bargains are considered to be 
the extra element present in shrinkwrap licenses. It is possible to argue that shrinkwrap licenses 
should not be enforced solely from a contract law perspective. See id. (arguing that for clarity, the 
issues of unconscionability and lack of negotiation should be resolved by turning to basic contract 
law). While this is true, these contract issues are bundled into the federal arguments made in Bowers 
and ProCD, and thus are best responded to in that same context. 
 130. For a discussion of why shrinkwrap licenses should be considered contracts of adhesion, 
see Goodman, supra note 11, at 354–59. See also Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336–37 (Dyk, J., dissenting); 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that contracts of adhesion 
are “form contracts that are not subject to negotiation”); W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 566 (1971) 
(“[Contracts] of adhesion do not express consent.”). 
 131. Bernstein v. GTE Directories Corp., 827 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); 
see also Shaffer v. Graybill, 68 Fed. Appx. 374 (3d Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Gray v. Am. Express Co., 743 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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 Adhesion contracts allow a company with tremendous bargaining 
power132 to bind a consumer, without any bargaining power, to a “take it 
or leave it” ultimatum. Following the analysis employed by one court, a 
shrinkwrap license is a contract of adhesion because the license consists 
of standardized terms, the proffering party has far superior bargaining 
power, and the license is offered on a nonnegotiable “take it or leave it” 
basis.133 There is no assent (and therefore no bargain) where there is a 
gross inequality of bargaining power together with terms that 
unreasonably favor the licensor.134 Therefore, the extra element of 
bargain is not present in contract claims involving shrinkwrap 
licenses.135
 132. With regard to computer software, software developers enjoy a tremendous amount of 
bargaining power. Often, they have a monopoly on software that is compatible to specific hardware 
devices; upgrades and older versions of software must be compatible, etc. A consumer cannot easily 
“shop around” between software developers to find software that is compatible with the consumer’s 
hardware. 
 133. Guthman v. La Vida Llena, spelled out the requirements for an adhesion contract: 
Three elements must be satisfied before an adhesion contract may be found. First, the 
agreement must occur in the form of a standardized contract . . . . Second, the party 
proffering the standardized contract must enjoy a superior bargaining position . . . . 
Finally, the contract must be offered to the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
without opportunity for bargaining. 
709 P.2d 675, 678 (N.M. 1985) (quoting Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
697 P.2d 128, 131–32 (1985)); see also SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 
1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“These courts have refused to recognize a bargain in shrinkwrap license that 
is not signed by the party against whom it is enforced.” (citing Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. 
Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II))). 
 134. This proposition is supported by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. 
d (1981): 
But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to 
the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of 
deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, 
no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms. 
Id. See also Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing the 
commentary on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS). 
 135. The author limits this assertion to shrinkwrap licenses commonly used in commercial 
transactions. While broad, this category of licenses seeks to exclude situations wherein parties enter 
into contracts with prior knowledge of the contract terms, prior experience with the other party, or 
where both parties have in fact consummated the contract after some negotiation. For example, 
where a party receives license materials under contract that he will later pay for the use of the 
materials, the extra element is the promise to pay. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 
446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the extra element of a promise to pay for the use of the work 
distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim). However, the author suggests that 
shrinkwrap licenses commonly used in commercial transactions are presented only after the payment 
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Nevertheless, Garry L. Founds argues that the element of bargain is 
inherent in all contracts, and therefore “renders contract rights innately 
different from copyright rights.”136 This logic invariably leads to the 
conclusion that every contract claim would escape preemption. Several 
courts have repudiated this assertion.137 Even ProCD stated, “Like the 
Supreme Court in Wolens, we think it prudent to refrain from adopting a 
rule that anything with the label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the 
preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to 
foresee.”138 The reason for this repudiation is clear: if no contract 
involving the rights of § 106 could ever be subjected to federal 
preemption, lawyers could dictate the application of copyright law 
through shrinkwrap licenses.139 Copyright law cannot be deprived of the 
power to preempt claims bearing the name “contract” that only regulate 
the rights enumerated in § 106.140
Founds also suggests that the extra element of bargain is present in 
shrinkwrap licenses because they are usually enforced as implied 
is tendered, and the prospective licensee is unfamiliar with the terms of the license and unable to 
negotiate any of these terms. 
 136. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107. 
 137. For example, in Wrench LLC, the court noted:  
In finding that appellants’ state law contract claim is not preempted, we do not embrace 
the proposition that all state law contract claims survive preemption simply because they 
involve the additional element of promise. . . . If the promise amounts only to a promise 
to refrain from reproducing, performing, distributing or displaying the work, then the 
contract claim is preempted. 
256 F.3d at 457; see, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosciszewski 
v. Arete Assocs., Inc, 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that a breach of contract claim was 
preempted by copyright law because it did not contain an extra element that distinguished it from 
copyright law); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431–33 
(8th Cir. 1993); see also Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license would be 
preempted by copyright law because it contained no extra element); see generally Vault II, 847 F.2d 
at 269 (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation 
of a computer program was preempted by federal copyright law because it touched upon an area of 
federal copyright law, the preemption of which in turn preempted the shrinkwrap license relying on 
the Louisiana Act). 
 138. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. 
 139. See Slawson, supra note 130, at 529. 
 140. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B)(1)(a) 
at 1–22 (2003) (“Although the vast majority of contract claims will presumably survive scrutiny . . . 
nonetheless pre-emption should continue to strike down claims that, though denominated ‘contract,’ 
nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of expressive materials.”). 
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agreements between the parties.141 However, as cited by Founds, 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211(3) suggests that “[w]here 
the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such 
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular 
term, the term is not part of the agreement.”142 It is reasonable to believe 
that prospective licensees would not enter into shrinkwrap licenses if 
they understood that entering into such constituted a waiver of their 
federal rights.143 Although Founds also states that there are “compelling 
policy arguments for the necessity of adhesion contracts,” such policy 
arguments deal only with the importance of simplification of the 
procedure and cost associated with negotiated contracts.144 While this 
policy is important to the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of 
Science and [the] Arts,”145 Congress has nevertheless stated that 
copyright law should dominate in the “vague borderline areas between 
State and Federal protection.”146 A further discussion of the merits of 
federal policy in this area follows below.147
The extra element of bargain is absent because contract claims based 
on shrinkwrap licenses are unconscionable. While an analysis of 
unconscionability may seem more appropriate in the context of state 
contract law, it is appropriate in this discussion because the 
determination of unconscionability ultimately bears on an interpretation 
of federal copyright policy.148 Unconscionability requires a finding of 
 141. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
section 211 to support the proposition that a party may manifest assent); see also supra notes 53–56 
and accompanying text. The court in I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002), considered the issue of whether a clickwrap agreement was 
enforceable. The court held that the clickwrap license was enforceable as an implied agreement 
because of the previous relationship of the parties and similar contracts that they had formerly 
entered into; thus, the later contract at issue was enforceable because it did not create an undue 
hardship on the licensee nor materially change the terms of previously-entered-into contracts. This 
finding of an implied agreement relies heavily on the previous contractual agreements between two 
savvy companies. This case should not stand for the broad proposition that every shrinkwrap license 
is enforceable; certainly, there are numerous cases in which unlearned and inexperienced consumers 
are forced to forgo statutory rights. In such cases, a greater level of scrutiny is appropriate in 
determining whether or not there is actual bargain. 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). 
 143. See infra notes 148–54 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746. 
 147. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 148. Slawson, supra note 130, observed: 
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procedural and substantive unconscionability.149 Contract claims based 
on shrinkwrap licenses are procedurally unconscionable as contracts of 
adhesion;150 however, the aspect of substantive unconscionability is a 
separate determination which requires state judges to interpret federal 
issues. A judge must weigh the value of federal rights against state rights 
arguably established through nonnegotiable “contracts” between parties 
of extremely different bargaining power. Substantive unconscionability 
is a federal issue masquerading as a state law issue because it involves 
consideration of a contract’s reasonableness, commercial impact, and 
other policy matters that are best answered by federal copyright law.151 
There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, its legitimacy rests 
entirely on its compliance with standards in the public interest. The individual who is 
subject to the obligations imposed by a standard form thus gains the assurance that the 
rules to which he is subject have received his consent either directly or through their 
conforming to higher public laws and standards made and enforced by the public 
institutions that legitimately govern him. 
Id. at 566. 
 149. See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Courts have 
generally recognized that the doctrine of unconscionability involves both ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ elements.”). Procedural unconscionability involves a consideration of how the contract 
is negotiated, inequality of bargaining power, and the way in which the terms are presented. See 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantive unconscionability 
focuses on the effects beyond the contract itself. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (reciting the elements 
considered in an unconscionability determination); see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 
F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Substantive unconscionability concerns the ‘terms of the 
agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’” (quoting Ingle v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003))) (citations omitted); Harris v. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Substantive unconscionability refers to 
contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored 
party does not assent.”); Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 296 n.12 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that “substantive unconscionability reminds us of contracts or clauses contrary to public 
policy or illegal” (quoting 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (3d ed. 
1988))); Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (reasoning that 
substantive unconscionability involves a determination of reasonableness and policy). 
 150. Because the nature of shrinkwrap licenses is the same as contracts of adhesion, such 
licenses are procedurally unconscionable. See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of shrinkwrap 
licenses as contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir 2002) (“A 
contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a standardized contract, 
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the 
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”); Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 783 (finding that an 
employment contract presented on a “take it or leave it” basis was procedurally unconscionable as a 
contract of adhesion); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 535 
U.S. 1112 (2002); Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001) (“A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural 
unconscionability.”). 
 151. See supra note 149. The author submits that the policy considerations inherent in 
evaluating the substantive conscionability of shrinkwrap licenses are central to the policy 
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The text and legislative history of § 301, as discussed above,152 suggest 
that contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses are substantively 
unconscionable because they seek to protect the same rights as copyright 
law does. Additionally, federal law should preempt shrinkwrap license 
provisions that seek to subdue the fair use rights granted to the public 
under § 117 of the Copyright Act.153 Finally, contracts based on 
shrinkwrap licenses are substantively unconscionable because these 
would allow shrinkwrap license drafters to expand state law protections 
beyond the limits already established by federal law.154 Therefore, the 
extra element of bargain is not present where shrinkwrap licenses are 
unconscionable. 
The extra element of bargain appears illusory because it can be 
viewed as tightly bound with almost any transaction between parties, 
thus making it difficult to argue that it belongs solely to contract law. For 
example, a copyright claim incorporates bargain. The copyright owner 
agrees to disclose the copyrightable expression in order to further the 
“Progress of Science and [the] Arts,”155 and in return, the government 
bestows the valuable consideration of a copyright, which allows the 
copyright owner to bring suit against alleged infringers;156 thus, this 
transaction involves bargain. Such an interpretation is not unlike what 
the courts have done in parsing legal lines in order to develop a so-called 
extra element that distinguishes contract and shrinkwrap claims that 
ultimately involve equivalent rights under § 106. While many of the 
extra elements used by courts in the past have been significant,157 there 
is no such significance when dealing with bargain. Because bargain is an 
extra element that can be tenuously extracted from any transaction, it 
considerations of federal copyright law, and a determination of substantive unconscionabilty must 
take into consideration the policy underlying federal copyright law. 
 152. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 153. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of how shrinkwrap licenses conflict with the fair 
use doctrine. 
 154. This argument suggests that by drafting shrinkwrap licenses, lawyers could thereby 
engage in the lawmaking process. This concern was identified by W. David Slawson over thirty 
years ago. See Slawson, supra note 130. Slawson argues in part that because standard form contracts 
dominate society and involve terms that are not agreed upon, but rather imposed, lawyers are able to 
engage in the lawmaking process. Id. 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 156. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any 
United States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title.”). 
 157. See listing of cases supra note 87. 
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appears nonsubstantive and arbitrary. Even in the context of copyright, it 
is possible to argue that any user of a copyrighted work enters into an 
implied agreement with the copyright owner not to infringe the § 106 
rights. Clearly, it would not be proper to allow breach of contract claims 
based on the bargain involved in these implied agreements. Furthermore, 
as discussed in the following paragraph, where overlap between contract 
and copyright law results in vagueness, copyright law should control. 
Finally, the extra element of bargain is not proper because this 
controversy lies in “vague borderline areas between State and Federal 
protection” wherein Congress intended federal law to dominate.158 The 
intent of Congress was to allow § 301 to be powerful in such areas. The 
situation in Bowers was extremely sympathetic: Baystate reverse 
engineered and began marketing Bowers’ software. This created intense 
competition in the marketplace and forced Bowers to bundle the software 
with another company’s (Cadkey) software, likely suffering 
economically as a result. Shortly thereafter, Baystate took over Cadkey 
and eliminated Bowers from the Cadkey network. However, this 
Comment submits that even in vague borderline areas warranting 
sympathy from the courts, Congress has indicated that federal law should 
dominate. 
For the foregoing reasons, courts should not rely on the extra 
element of bargain to deny preemption of contract claims based on 
shrinkwrap licenses. However, due to the threat that shrinkwrap licenses 
also pose to the doctrine of fair use found in § 107 of the Copyright Act, 
such licenses should be preempted by copyright law based on a conflict 
preemption analysis. 
B. Conflict Preemption is Proper Where Shrinkwrap  
Licenses Threaten the Fair Use Doctrine 
It has been argued that “[a] state is not free to eliminate the fair use 
defense.”159 If copyright law cannot preempt breach of contract claims 
based on shrinkwrap licenses, then fair use is vitiated. In other words, 
because the fair use doctrine only provides exceptions to copyright 
infringement, persons making a fair use of a copyrighted work would not 
be insulated from breach of contract claims.160 Thus, allowing breach of 
 158. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746. 
 159. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1336 (Fed. Cir.) (Dyk, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003). 
 160. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses sets at naught the fair use 
doctrine and the purposes of Congress.161 This result should be avoided 
for two reasons. First, it is improper to not preempt shrinkwrap 
agreements that are “far broader [in scope] than the protection afforded 
by copyright law.”162 Second, the purposes and policy of copyright law 
support preemption of shrinkwrap licenses. 
1. Shrinkwrap licenses may eliminate fair use by protecting rights that 
are broader than the rights protected under copyright law 
Evisceration of fair use, accomplished when breach of contract 
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses overcome corresponding federal 
copyright claims, allows shrinkwrap licenses to create a form of 
protection greater than that available under copyright or patent law.163 
Without fair use, shrinkwrap licenses would cause copyright protection 
to “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”164 Thus, by 
simply using shrinkwrap licenses on her software, a software developer 
would be able to create protection for her ideas akin to patent protection 
(much broader than copyright protection),165 and thereby create rights 
that are equivalent to the separate rights protected under the Copyright 
and Patent Acts.166 Because the creation of these rights is untenable and 
even precluded under copyright and patent law,167 shrinkwrap licenses 
must be preempted. 
 161. See the discussion of the purposes of Congress in enacting the Copyright Act and § 301 
supra Part III.A.2. 
 162. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326. 
 163. To be sure, computer software protection under the copyright law is notably distinct from 
patent protection and protection under the DMCA. In order to obtain a patent for a computer 
software program, the program must meet the elevated requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, 
and originality. The patentee of a computer program could then successfully sue for unauthorized 
use of her idea, process, or method of operation or equivalents thereof. Copyright protection is a 
lesser form of protection than that of a patent. Copyright protection extends only to “original works 
of authorship,” and a remedy under copyright law is only available when factual copying is proved, 
as discussed above. See §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act cited supra note 77. 
 164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 165. For a brief description of the difference between copyright and patent protection, see 
supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 166. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102. 
 167. Section 301(a), as discussed previously in this Comment, prohibits the creation of state 
rights that are equivalent to the rights protected under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
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2. Conflict preemption of shrinkwrap license terms that eviscerate the 
fair use doctrine is proper 
Conflict preemption is appropriate where state contract law, as 
applied to shrinkwrap licenses, conflicts directly with the fair use 
doctrine of § 107 of the Copyright Act. State law may be displaced under 
a conflict preemption analysis168 when that state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”169 This form of preemption has also been 
compared to preemption under the Supremacy Clause; that is, it is a form 
of preemption “that goes beyond [§] 301 to discuss whether . . . state 
law . . . is an ‘obstacle’ to the objectives of the Copyright Act.”170 This 
section presents the conflict between § 107 of the Copyright Act and 
state law, delineates some of the goals of copyright law, and shows how 
the evisceration of the fair use doctrine by shrinkwrap license 
contravenes these goals. Finally, this section submits that under the 
conflict preemption analysis, contract claims based on shrinkwrap 
contracts should be preempted by federal law in order to eliminate the 
conflict with § 107 and thereby protect the fair use doctrine. 
As an initial matter, the conflict preemption analysis, based in policy 
considerations, is different from the preemption analysis under § 301. 
While a § 301 analysis preempts state rights that are equivalent to federal 
rights, conflict preemption weighs the effect of the state claim against the 
underlying policy of the Copyright Act.171 Thus, conflict preemption 
arises when a state law compromises the purposes and objectives of 
Congress because “federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or its 
benefits denied’ by the state law.”172
Shrinkwrap license prohibitions often conflict with the fair use 
doctrine in § 107 of the Copyright Act. As detailed above,173 the fair use 
doctrine is important for educational institutions, libraries, and various 
Additionally, the Patent Act prohibits the creation of patent-like rights unless obtained through a 
valid patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102. 
 168. See supra note 72. 
 169. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 170. Founds, supra note 49, at 104 n.21 (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AGE 812–13 (1997)). 
 171. Founds, supra note 49, at 104. 
 172. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. 
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)). 
 173. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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other individuals who use copyrighted works in areas such as teaching, 
comment, criticism, and scholarship.174 Reverse engineering is a valid 
fair use which encourages innovation and technological progress.175 
However, where shrinkwrap license provisions prohibit the right to 
access, copy, dissemble, decompile, or convert software for 
noncommercial purposes,176 they conflict with federal law and an 
analysis under conflict preemption is appropriate. 
The purposes and goals of copyright law are apparent from case law 
regarding the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court outlined the goals of 
copyright law in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music:177 “[T]he goals of the 
copyright law [are] ‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying 
matter’”178 and “to promote science and the arts.”179 The Court added 
that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”180 Critical to the goal 
of progress, the Copyright Act provides the digital fair use exception to 
copyright infringement that allows others to build on and benefit from 
the work of others.181 Thus, shrinkwrap license provisions that nullify 
these federally granted rights should be preempted by copyright law 
under a conflict preemption analysis. 
Shrinkwrap license restrictions on archival copying of copyrighted 
materials conflict with § 107 because archival copying is a defensible 
fair use. Under the fair use analysis, although archival copying is a direct 
and complete copy of the copyrighted work, the effect on the market and 
the purpose and character of use justify treating archival copying as a fair 
use.182 Simply put, archival copying allows consumers to protect their 
investment by creating personal copies that would be used only if the 
original is destroyed. Thus, there is no effect on the original market.183 
 174. See supra notes 4, 22. 
 175. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 176. For an example of such a license, refer to the Vault license described in Part II.B.2.b. 
 177. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 178. Id. at 578 n.10 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1134 (1990)). 
 179. Id. at 579. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the doctrine of fair use 
and its purposes. 
 182. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 183. It may be argued that archival copying does create some effect on the original market 
because the replacement copies of the lost or destroyed software are never purchased. But if a 
developer only licenses the software to the consumer, then the initial purchase of the software 
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Backing up copyrighted works for archival storage and protection is not 
sinister in character. It is merely a noncommercial use that insulates the 
consumer. Restrictions on the fair use of archival copying found in 
shrinkwrap licenses should therefore be preempted under conflict 
preemption. 
Shrinkwrap license restrictions on reverse engineering also conflict 
with § 107. As mentioned above, reverse engineering has been identified 
as a valid fair use.184 Restrictions on reverse engineering do not 
“promote science and the arts” because these prohibitions stifle teaching, 
criticism, research, and technological progress in general.185 The 
importance of reverse engineering is embodied in the statement: 
“Innovation is not a private act—it is seldom the product of a single 
individual’s intellectual brilliance. Innovation is a product of the 
connections between individuals and their ideas. . . . It is the constant 
interplay of ideas, perspectives, experiences and values that spawns 
innovation.”186 A restriction on reverse engineering through shrinkwrap 
licenses slows innovation because it inhibits research and development 
of new ideas and technologies.187 Shrinkwrap restrictions on the fair use 
of reverse engineering found in shrinkwrap licenses should therefore be 
preempted under conflict preemption. 
accounts for a purchased license to use the software, and a replacement purchase would amount to 
the purchase of a second license. Where a license has already been properly acquired, it may seem 
unfair to require the purchase of duplicative licenses when the original software is lost or destroyed. 
 184. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 185. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. It is also possible to argue that restricting reverse engineering 
promotes the science and the arts. This argument suggests that a developer would therefore be able 
capitalize on her own work instead of losing profits to competitors who develop takeoffs. While this 
is facially convincing, it fails to consider that courts are willing to hold alleged infringers liable 
where the accused article is a rough equivalent of the copyrighted work. See supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. This reality should change the way reverse engineering is viewed; reverse 
engineering should be considered an altruistic activity that is educational and scholarly. Regardless, 
unscrupulous competitors who use reverse engineering to create rough equivalents will likely be 
held liable for the same. This reasoning is supported by the policy for allowing reverse engineering 
propounded in Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. See supra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. GARY HAMEL, LEADING THE REVOLUTION 280 (2000). 
 187. While one may argue that the reverse engineering of computer software cannot be a fair 
use because it may ultimately have a commercial goal (eventual creation of a competing product), 
such circumstances are contemplated by the purposes of copyright law. As stated in Campbell, the 
goals of copyright are furthered by the creation of transformative works. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
Furthermore, the monopoly created by copyright law serves to entice software developers to develop 
new and improved technologies, and such technological progression must necessarily follow a 
predecessor. 
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Shrinkwrap license restrictions on converting or translating software 
also contradict § 107 of the Copyright Act. These restrictions frustrate 
the purposes of copyright law because they create artificial barriers to 
information and may result in perpetual monopolies over nonprotectable 
information thereby suffocating innovation.188 Typically, a software 
program is designed to be interoperable with only a few other programs. 
Under the terms of a shrinkwrap license, however, users are forbidden 
from adapting these programs to suit their needs.189 This restriction 
creates a barrier on the fair use doctrine that would otherwise protect 
consumers’ right to noncommercial adaptation of computer software.190 
Congress was careful to avoid such a restriction when drafting the 
DMCA. Although the DMCA forbids “accessing” a computer program, 
it carves out an exception for activities that are necessary to achieve 
interoperability with other programs (which is a fair use).191 This 
example should serve as an archetype when courts consider the validity 
of shrinkwrap restrictions on fair uses. Ultimately, shrinkwrap license 
restrictions on the fair uses of converting or translating software for 
noncommercial purposes should be preempted under conflict 
preemption. 
Several courts have already used the conflict preemption analysis to 
allow copyright law to preempt state claims. In Associated Film 
Distribution Corp. v. Thornburg,192 the Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a claim based on 
Pennsylvania law was preempted by federal copyright law, because 
where the two are in conflict, “the Supremacy Clause [i.e., federal law] is 
decisive.”193 Additionally, the rationale in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software 
 188. Some may argue that in the world of computer software a copyright is “perpetual” 
because the software protected thereunder would likely become obsolete prior to the end of the term 
of the copyright. While this might be true in some cases, the monopoly authorized by the 
Constitution is certainly not “limited” when uncopyrightable material is protected by a shrinkwrap 
license. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 189. For an example of such a license, refer to the Vault license described supra in Part 
II.B.2.b. 
 190. Along these same lines, the court in Vault found that the Louisiana License Act was 
preempted by federal law because it allowed software developers to prohibit adaptation and 
decompilation of computer programs in direct conflict with § 117 of the Copyright Act. See Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II). 
 191. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000). 
 192. 520 F. Supp. 971, 993 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d 
808 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 193. Id. 
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Ltd.194 suggests that the court based its decision, at least in part, on 
conflict preemption. The Fifth Circuit found that because the Louisiana 
License Act “‘touched upon the area’ of federal copyright law, its 
provisions were preempted and Vault’s license agreement was 
unenforceable.”195
In summary, conflict preemption is appropriate where contract 
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses conflict with the fair use doctrine of 
§ 107 of the Copyright Act. Finding to the contrary would allow state 
contract law to subdue the fair use doctrine, contravening important 
policy considerations supporting fair use. Furthermore, as the next part 
demonstrates, shrinkwrap licenses are becoming increasingly 
unnecessary due to the sharp judicial awareness of the peculiarities of the 
software industry, the collective desire to protect developer interests, and 
the ability to do so with effective tools. 
IV. SHRINKING NEED FOR SHRINKWRAPS: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE 
DMCA, TEMPERED BY THE TRADITIONAL FAIR USE ANALYSIS, 
PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AND OF  
SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS 
The power of the Copyright Act makes shrinkwrap licenses 
unnecessary. An application of copyright law, tempered by the doctrine 
of fair use, can protect the interests of software developers without 
creating conflicts with federal law. For example, in a world without 
shrinkwrap licenses, where a party purchases software and later makes 
unauthorized commercial use of it, copyright law would ensure a fair 
solution. The accused infringer may assert a digital fair use defense, but a 
court would likely dismiss the fair use defense due to the commercial 
nature of the use and its effect on the product’s market. Of course, in 
other situations where a fair use exists, a court will properly find against 
infringement. These equitable results can be achieved without relying on 
shrinkwrap licenses that subdue the fair use doctrine of § 107. Therefore, 
through an application of copyright law and the digital fair use doctrine, 
courts can protect the economic interests of computer developers.196
 194. Vault II, 847 F.2d at 269. 
 195. Id. (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987) 
(Vault I)). 
 196. This assertion is founded in an economic, rather than a moral-based, rationale. See supra 
note 14. Although it has been suggested that copyright law is now applied with a moralistic 
approach, O’Rourke, supra note 14, at 483 & n.15, the practical economic effect of the author’s 
SMI-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 11:31:28 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1414 
 
The four prongs of the fair use analysis require the court to consider 
(1) the commercial nature, character, and purpose of the use; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
copyrighted work that was used; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”197
The first prong requires a court to analyze “the purpose and character 
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”198 In Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music,199 
the Court noted that this prong first determines whether the use is for 
criticism, teaching, comment, news reporting, or other uses found in § 
107; the purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether or not the use is 
transformative.200 In Campbell, the Court reversed a finding of 
infringement because 2 Live Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” was sufficiently transformative and would therefore not affect 
the original market.201 When applying the first prong to the computer 
software market, a court would likely find any use that interferes with the 
commercial interests of a computer developer weighs against a finding of 
fair use. However, consumers’ free use of copyrighted materials for 
limited personal, noncommercial purposes, such as archival copying, 
would not likely violate this prong. Judicial adherence to the traditional 
fair use analysis will ensure that infringing software users will be 
punished and that the public’s right to make fair use of copyrighted 
digital materials will be protected.  
The second and fourth prongs of the fair use analysis require the 
court to consider “the nature of the copyrighted work”202 and “the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.”203 In considering the effect of the use on the market, a court 
determines whether the allegedly infringing work is a “substitute for the 
original [that] usurp[s] a market that properly belongs to the copyright 
assertion that copyright law adequately protects the economic interests of computer developers must 
be considered.  
 197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 198. Id. § 107(1). 
 199. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 200. Id. at 578–79. 
 201. Id. at 594. The court reasoned that the parodic rap song produced by 2 Live Crew 
targeted a different market than the original version of the song. Therefore, there would be no 
commercial effect of 2 Live Crew’s use on the original market of Roy Orbison’s song. 
 202. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 203. Id. § 107(4). 
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holder.”204 These prongs allow the courts to consider the special nature 
of computer software—that any unauthorized commercial use may 
significantly impair the value of the software for the computer 
developer.205 Considering this, courts may hold allegedly infringing 
activities to a higher level of scrutiny. Courts may accomplish this by 
increasing the burden of proof of innocence placed on the accused 
infringer. 
Finally, courts carefully weigh “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”206 
understanding that even minimal use of the heart of a computer software 
program can harm the software developer. It is not requisite to prove 
exact copying; a court may use its latitude to show legal copying, i.e., 
substantial similarity.207 Under this prong, courts have long been able to 
penalize unscrupulous competitors when “substantial similarity” and 
“proof of access” can be shown.208
In the end, shrinkwrap licenses are unnecessary because the 
Copyright Act creates a refuge that is robust enough to protect the 
interests of software developers, and circumspect enough to preserve the 
fair use doctrine. Copyright law has not lost its power to punish those 
who offend the policies of the Copyright Act. Where unscrupulous 
competitors raise the fair use defense to a claim of infringement, courts 
can consider the entire landscape of the case and make appropriate 
decisions. By applying the traditional fair use analysis, courts are capable of 
protecting the interests of the public and of software developers.209
 204. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Infinity 
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 205. “Commercial use” in this context refers to a use that may affect the value of the software, 
whether or not the user profits from the commercial use. It is clear that sales of unauthorized copies 
will directly affect the market of the original work. However, a commercial use would also include 
instances where software is simply made available to others for pirating. Pirating invariably has an 
effect on the market because it steals away prospective purchasers. 
 206. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 207. Actual copying is shown where the defendant has copied portions of the copyrighted 
work verbatim. Legal copying is proven on a sliding scale: the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant’s work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work and that the defendant had access 
to the copyrighted work. 
 208. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Even in the 
absence of verbatim copying, a copyright owner may show infringement ‘by showing that the 
infringer had access to the work and that the two works are substantially similar.’” (quoting Shaw v. 
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
 209. It is possible to argue that the interests of software developers are not served because 
without shrinkwrap licenses the burden on software developers would increase because causes of 
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Copyright law should preempt breach of contract claims based on 
shrinkwrap licenses for several reasons. First, preemption is proper under § 
301 of the Copyright Act. Courts that have refused preemption under § 301 
by applying the extra element test have improperly based their decision on 
the extra element of bargain—an element that is not present in shrinkwrap 
licenses because there is no other option to the consumer but to accept the 
license or return the software to the developer. 
Second, preemption is necessary in order to preserve the digital fair use 
doctrine from evisceration. This doctrine should not be nullified by 
shrinkwrap licenses because it serves the underlying policies of copyright 
law, “to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter”210 and “to 
promote science and the arts.”211 Evisceration of the fair use is problematic 
because it allows shrinkwrap licenses to create a form of protection greater 
than that available under copyright or patent law. By weighing the practical 
effects of the shrinkwrap licensing provisions against the purposes of 
copyright law, courts should be moved to invalidate such provisions. 
Finally, preemption of shrinkwrap licenses is proper because it still 
allows protection of software developers. Copyright law, tempered by the 
doctrine of fair use, makes shrinkwrap licenses unnecessary by sufficiently 
protecting the interests of software developers and the public. 
Nathan Smith
action in copyright tempered by a four-pronged fair use test would be more expensive to litigate than 
causes of action based in contract. The author first notes that no comprehensive studies have been 
produced regarding this concern. Second, while this is a valid concern, it depends greatly on the 
facts of each individual case. Generally, a breach of contract claim and a copyright claim will both 
require the plaintiff to prove several elements; in turn, the burden of proving defenses to both claims 
rests squarely on the accused. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that a copyright claim would be any 
more expensive to litigate than a breach of contract claim. 
 210. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra 
note 178, at 1134). 
 211. Id. at 579. 
